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1. Introduction	  	  
On	  May	  21,	  2011,	  precisely	  when	  the	  president	  of	  Chile	  Sebastían	  Piñera	  was	  ready	  to	  
address	  the	  Chilean	  parliament	  regarding	  legislative	  initiatives	  for	  the	  upcoming	  year,	  more	  
than	  20,000	  students	  gathered	  outside	  the	  parliamentary	  building	  calling	  on	  the	  government	  to	  
address	  problems	  within	  the	  education	  system.	  Diego	  Vela,	  president	  of	  FEUC,	  a	  prominent	  
student	  organization,	  stated	  the	  following:	  “Since	  it	  is	  a	  year	  with	  presidential	  and	  
parliamentary	  elections,	  it	  opens	  up	  the	  opportunity	  to	  influence	  the	  main	  platforms	  and	  look	  
for	  structural	  changes”	  (I	  Love	  Chile).	  President	  Piñera’s	  speech,	  however,	  ignored	  student	  
demands,	  and	  consequently	  students	  intensified	  their	  campaign	  by	  announcing	  new	  rallies	  and	  
threatening	  an	  indefinite	  strike	  if	  government	  did	  not	  meet	  their	  demands.	  Students	  began	  
overtaking	  schools	  and	  universities.	  Books	  were	  burned	  and	  school	  desks	  were	  used	  to	  
barricade	  school	  entrances	  (Guzman-­‐Concha	  2013,	  413-­‐414).	  
The	  protest	  begun	  in	  May	  2011	  is	  just	  one	  of	  many	  incidents	  showing	  a	  societal	  
rejection	  of	  the	  Chilean	  education	  system.	  Each	  year	  student	  organizations	  stage	  protest	  
campaigns	  in	  March,	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  academic	  year	  in	  Chile.	  The	  intensity	  of	  the	  
demonstrations	  varies	  and	  usually	  reaches	  its	  max	  between	  May	  and	  June.	  Major	  unions,	  public	  
sector	  workers,	  university	  chancellors	  and	  faculty	  members,	  and	  even	  popular	  television	  
celebrities	  join	  the	  protesting	  students	  at	  times	  (Guzman-­‐Concha	  2012,	  412-­‐413).	  	  McEwan	  et	  
al.	  describe	  Chilean	  society’s	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  following:	  
Chile	  is	  perhaps	  the	  only	  country	  in	  Latin	  America	  where	  a	  majority	  of	  citizens	  list	  
education	  quality	  and	  equity	  as	  one	  of	  their	  main	  political	  concerns	  and	  
education	  issues	  are	  regularly	  featured	  in	  the	  media	  (2008,	  25).	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Popular	  rejection	  of	  the	  school	  system	  is	  significant	  not	  only	  for	  Chile	  but	  also	  for	  
advocates	  of	  School	  Choice	  Theory.	  The	  Chilean	  school	  system	  is	  referenced	  in	  school	  choice	  
literature	  as	  an	  example	  of	  Milton	  Friedman’s	  School	  Choice	  Theory	  in	  action.	  	  Researchers	  
often	  conclude	  that	  Friedman’s	  School	  Choice	  Theory	  is	  unsuccessful	  because	  they	  see	  the	  
Chilean	  education	  protests	  as	  an	  indicator	  that	  the	  system	  has	  failed.	  	  
This	  thesis	  examines	  whether	  the	  Chilean	  school	  system	  is	  indeed	  an	  example	  of	  
Friedman’s	  school	  choice.	  When	  the	  Chilean	  case	  is	  examined	  closely	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  
while	  scholars	  and	  journalists	  label	  the	  Chilean	  education	  system	  as	  a	  Friedman-­‐style	  school	  
choice	  system,	  its	  implementation	  of	  school	  choice	  principles	  has	  fallen	  critically	  short	  of	  the	  
mark.	  	  
This	  thesis	  seeks	  to	  contribute	  to	  related	  literature	  by	  redefining	  the	  Chilean	  school	  
choice	  system.	  The	  Chilean	  education	  system	  is	  not	  an	  example	  of	  Friedman-­‐style	  school	  
choice;	  instead,	  it	  is	  an	  example	  of	  the	  incomplete	  implementation	  of	  Friedman’s	  ideas.	  The	  
Chilean	  government’s	  half-­‐hearted	  approach	  to	  School	  Choice	  Theory	  has	  resulted	  in	  many	  of	  
the	  current	  education	  protests	  that	  rock	  the	  country.	  Whereas	  the	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  
School	  Choice	  Theory	  function	  holistically,	  the	  lack	  of	  adequate	  implementation	  of	  just	  one	  
principle	  greatly	  affects	  the	  implementation	  of	  other	  principles.	  	  
To	  demonstrate	  this	  conclusion,	  I	  will	  first	  provide	  necessary	  context	  through	  a	  
discussion	  on	  Chilean	  sentiments	  toward	  education.	  A	  brief	  synopsis	  highlighting	  the	  rationale	  
of	  the	  connection	  between	  Milton	  Friedman	  and	  Chile	  will	  follow.	  Next,	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  
foundation	  for	  my	  subsequent	  analysis,	  I	  will	  discuss	  a	  perfect	  application	  of	  Friedman’s	  School	  
Choice	  Theory.	  Central	  to	  this	  discussion,	  I	  will	  define	  three	  aspects	  of	  Friedman’s	  theory	  that	  I	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deem	  critical	  to	  his	  voucher	  plan:	  competition,	  decentralization,	  and	  parental	  demand.	  These	  
elements	  of	  Friedman’s	  theory	  will	  then	  be	  examined	  in	  regards	  to	  their	  implementation	  in	  the	  
Chilean	  education	  system.	  	  The	  thesis	  will	  conclude	  by	  assessing	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  
Chile’s	  education	  system,	  with	  its	  attendant	  problems	  and	  resulting	  social	  rejection,	  represents	  
a	  failure	  of	  Friedman	  style	  school	  choice.	  
	  
2.	  Chileans’	  Rejection	  of	  their	  Education	  System	  
A	  discussion	  of	  education	  policy	  in	  Chile	  must	  start	  in	  the	  1960s	  with	  the	  administration	  
of	  Eduardo	  Frei,	  Sr.	  During	  this	  time,	  liberal	  parties	  recruited	  from	  the	  Chilean	  student	  
population,	  and	  these	  student	  organizations	  became	  training	  grounds	  for	  future	  party	  leaders.	  	  
As	  a	  result	  student	  values	  tended	  to	  center	  around	  free	  education	  and	  government	  oversight.	  
Under	  the	  educational	  policies	  of	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  teachers	  became	  accustomed	  to	  
centralized	  wages	  and	  labor	  protection.	  Education	  was	  considered	  a	  free	  public	  good	  (Guzman-­‐
Concha	  2013,	  413-­‐414).	  
In	  1970	  Salvador	  Allende	  took	  office	  and	  began	  socializing	  main	  sectors	  of	  society.	  In	  
regards	  to	  education,	  he	  sought	  to	  broaden	  opportunities	  through	  institutional	  and	  curricular	  
reforms	  reflecting	  socialist	  political	  beliefs	  (Delannoy	  2000,	  7).	  These	  reforms	  were	  never	  
implemented,	  however,	  because	  on	  September	  11,	  1973,	  a	  military	  coup	  d’état	  directed	  by	  
General	  Augusto	  Pinochet,	  commander	  of	  the	  Chilean	  Army,	  resulted	  in	  the	  replacement	  of	  
Allende’s	  administration	  (Smith	  2000,	  177).	  
General	  Pinochet	  instituted	  neoliberal	  reforms	  and	  privatized	  the	  majority	  of	  entities	  
that	  had	  previously	  been	  operated	  publicly	  including	  one	  hundred-­‐sixty	  corporations,	  sixteen	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banks,	  three	  thousand-­‐six	  hundred	  agro-­‐industrial	  plants,	  mines,	  real	  estate,	  and	  the	  education	  
system	  (Collins	  and	  Lear	  1991).	  Many	  Chileans	  opposed	  Pinochet’s	  military	  dictatorship	  and	  its	  
neo-­‐liberal	  agenda.	  At	  the	  forefront	  of	  disagreement	  to	  the	  regime	  were	  university	  and	  
secondary	  students.	  Teachers	  also	  joined	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  decentralization	  and	  free-­‐market	  
principles	  implemented	  in	  the	  education	  sector	  (Delannoy	  2000,	  7-­‐8).	  These	  Pinochet	  era	  
reforms	  were	  in	  direct	  opposition	  to	  the	  societal	  values	  of	  free	  education	  and	  central	  oversight	  
that	  were	  developed	  during	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s.	  	  
Since	  the	  end	  of	  Pinochet’s	  administration,	  the	  liberalist	  Chilean	  government	  has	  
attempted	  to	  appease	  an	  upset	  populace	  through	  softer	  policy	  changes	  (Delannoy	  2000,	  13-­‐14;	  
McEwan	  et	  al.	  2008,	  24).	  Examples	  include	  increased	  funding	  for	  students	  using	  public	  
transportation	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  presidential	  advisory	  board	  on	  education,	  which	  included	  
twelve	  seats	  for	  select	  students	  (BBC	  News	  2006).	  These	  newer	  policy	  actions	  have	  not	  quelled	  
the	  Chilean	  people’s	  concerns.	  	  
	  
	  
3.	  Friedman	  and	  Chile	  
The	  temptation	  to	  cast	  Chile’s	  education	  system	  as	  an	  exemplar	  of	  Friedman’s	  School	  
Choice	  Theory	  is	  based	  in	  two	  aspects	  of	  Chile’s	  education	  history:	  	  1)	  the	  Chicago	  Boys	  and	  
their	  relationship	  with	  Milton	  Friedman,	  and	  2)	  Friedman’s	  subsequent	  visit	  to	  Chile	  in	  1975.	  
The	  apparent	  connection	  between	  Friedman	  and	  Chile	  is	  indeed	  conceivable,	  but,	  as	  will	  be	  
shown	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  this	  association	  does	  not	  necessitate	  a	  strong	  correlation	  between	  
Friedman’s	  School	  Choice	  Theory	  and	  Chile’s	  education	  system.	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The	  main	  architects	  of	  Chilean	  economic	  and	  education	  reforms	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  80s	  
were	  members	  of	  a	  group	  called	  the	  Chicago	  Boys.	  These	  students,	  originally	  from	  the	  
Universidad	  Católica	  in	  Santiago,	  were	  sent	  to	  Chicago	  in	  an	  effort	  by	  the	  US	  State	  Department	  
to	  counter	  growing	  trends	  toward	  isolationist	  policies	  in	  the	  Chilean	  political	  system	  (Klein	  
2007,	  59).	  Approximately	  100	  students	  received	  degrees	  in	  economics	  from	  the	  University	  of	  
Chicago	  between	  1957	  and	  1970.	  Friedman	  was	  a	  professor	  in	  the	  economics	  department	  at	  
the	  time	  they	  were	  in	  attendance	  at	  the	  university	  (Letelier	  1976).	  Klein	  commenting	  on	  the	  
Chicago	  Boys	  said	  the	  following:	  
[The	  Chicago	  Boys	  are]	  a	  striking	  example	  of	  an	  organized	  transfer	  of	  ideology	  from	  the	  
United	  States	  to	  a	  country	  within	  its	  direct	  sphere	  of	  influence...	  the	  education	  of	  these	  
Chileans	  derived	  from	  a	  specific	  project	  designed	  in	  the	  1950s	  to	  influence	  the	  
development	  of	  Chilean	  economic	  thinking.	  They	  introduced	  into	  Chilean	  society	  ideas	  
that	  were	  completely	  new,	  concepts	  entirely	  absent	  from	  the	  'ideas	  market'	  (2007,	  62).	  	  
	  
Prior	  to	  the	  military	  coup	  he	  orchestrated	  on	  September	  11,	  1973,	  General	  Augusto	  
Pinochet	  was	  introduced	  to	  the	  Chicago	  Boys	  and	  their	  text,	  El	  Ladrillo,	  a	  manifesto	  outlining	  
their	  policy	  recommendations	  for	  Chile	  (Hoover	  Institute	  2013).	  The	  ideas	  expressed	  in	  El	  
Ladrillo,	  meaning	  the	  brick,	  were	  representative	  of	  the	  Chicago	  Boys’	  training	  in	  economics	  at	  
the	  University	  of	  Chicago.	  Many	  of	  the	  concepts	  in	  the	  text	  were	  reflective	  of	  Milton	  Friedman’s	  
own	  policy	  recommendations.	  General	  Pinochet	  became	  sympathetic	  to	  their	  ideas,	  and	  the	  
Chicago	  Boys	  became	  his	  main	  economic	  policy	  advisors	  (Letelier	  1976).	  	  	  
Friedman	  visited	  Pinochet	  in	  Chile	  during	  a	  period	  of	  critical	  education	  and	  economic	  
reforms	  in	  1975.	  His	  visit	  was	  inspired	  by	  his	  desire	  to	  see	  the	  economic	  progress	  initiated	  by	  
the	  Chicago	  Boys	  (Letelier	  1976).	  Pinochet	  asked	  Friedman	  to	  write	  a	  letter	  proposing	  economic	  
remedies	  for	  Chile	  (Stephen,	  2010).	  Friedman	  responded	  by	  writing	  an	  eight-­‐point	  proposal.	  He	  
recommended	  reducing	  government	  deficits	  by	  cutting	  spending,	  decentralizing	  social	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programs	  such	  as	  social	  security	  and	  education,	  and	  decreasing	  inflation	  by	  limiting	  the	  amount	  
of	  money	  printed	  (Brauchle).	  Friedman’s	  letter	  mirrored	  the	  recommendations	  of	  the	  Chicago	  
Boys	  in	  El	  Ladrillo	  (Stephens,	  2010).	  	  
Friedman’s	  connection	  to	  the	  Chicago	  Boys	  and	  his	  visit	  to	  Chile	  have	  been	  interpreted	  
by	  some	  as	  an	  indicator	  that	  he	  was	  heavily	  influential	  in	  Chile’s	  reform	  process.	  The	  Chilean	  
school	  system	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  Friedman’s	  School	  Choice	  Theory	  (Hoover	  Institute	  2013;	  
Doherty	  2006).	  For	  example,	  Anthony	  Lewis,	  a	  New	  York	  Times	  columnist,	  stated,	  “the	  Chilean	  
junta’s	  economic	  policy	  is	  based	  on	  the	  ideas	  of	  Milton	  Friedman…and	  his	  Chicago	  School”	  
(Doherty	  2006).	  Additionally,	  prominent	  school	  choice	  researchers	  Hsieh	  and	  Urquiola	  (2000)	  
stated	  “Chile’s	  government	  established	  a	  ‘textbook’	  voucher	  scheme,”	  and	  in	  a	  2006	  paper	  they	  
said	  that	  they	  chose	  Chile	  as	  their	  main	  case	  study	  because	  it	  represented	  “a	  country	  that	  
implemented	  an	  unrestricted	  nationwide	  school	  choice	  program”	  (Hsieh	  and	  Urquiola	  2006,	  
1499).	  	  
Chilean	  researcher	  Claudio	  Sapelli	  is	  an	  exception.	  He	  argues	  that	  the	  most	  important	  
lesson	  from	  the	  Chilean	  experience	  is	  the	  importance	  of	  properly	  designing	  a	  voucher	  system,	  
(530).	  He	  explains	  further	  that	  by	  viewing	  Chile	  as	  an	  unrestricted	  Friedman	  school	  choice	  
system,	  researchers	  have	  been	  prevented	  from	  understanding	  how	  the	  structural	  design	  of	  the	  
Chilean	  system	  has	  determined	  the	  results	  in	  Chile	  (2003,	  530).	  
I	  agree	  with	  Sapelli.	  Structure	  matters,	  and	  the	  Chilean	  system	  should	  not	  be	  assumed	  
to	  be	  an	  application	  of	  Friedman’s	  theory.	  Regardless	  of	  Friedman’s	  influence	  in	  the	  Chilean	  
reform	  process,	  the	  actual	  implementation	  of	  the	  education	  system	  is	  the	  factor	  that	  
determines	  how	  closely	  the	  system	  follows	  Friedman’s	  School	  Choice.	  The	  structure	  and	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workings	  of	  the	  Chilean	  system	  need	  to	  be	  closely	  examined	  and	  compared	  to	  School	  Choice	  in	  
order	  to	  state	  that	  the	  education	  system	  is	  truly	  an	  example	  of	  Friedman’s	  School	  Choice	  
Theory.	  	  	  
	  
4. Friedman’s	  School	  Choice	  Theory	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  outline	  Milton	  Friedman’s	  Theory	  of	  School	  Choice	  
while	  creating	  a	  framework	  for	  a	  subsequent	  assessment	  of	  the	  Chilean	  education	  system.	  I	  will	  
discuss	  what	  I	  consider	  to	  be	  the	  three	  most	  
critical	  principles	  for	  a	  Friedman-­‐style	  school	  
choice	  system.	  The	  following	  matrix	  previews	  
the	  categories	  that	  will	  be	  used	  for	  this	  
assessment	  (see	  Textbox	  1).	  Each	  of	  the	  principles	  listed	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  its	  ideal	  state,	  as	  
espoused	  by	  Friedman.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  will	  draw	  a	  comparison	  between	  the	  ideal	  state	  of	  
these	  principles	  and	  their	  implementation	  in	  the	  Chilean	  case.	  
Friedman	  first	  introduced	  his	  theory	  of	  school	  choice	  in	  1955.	  Friedman’s	  theory	  is	  a	  
system,	  not	  a	  cafeteria	  from	  which	  principles	  can	  be	  chosen	  and	  implemented	  at	  will.	  School	  
choice	  principles	  are	  interrelated	  and	  the	  proper	  implementation	  of	  one	  affects	  the	  outcome	  of	  
others.	  	  
Friedman’s	  model	  includes	  a	  voucher	  system	  that	  would	  function	  similarly	  to	  the	  GI	  Bill	  
in	  the	  United	  States.	  Students	  would	  be	  issued	  vouchers	  to	  be	  redeemed	  at	  any	  accredited	  
educational	  entity.	  Friedman’s	  theory,	  however,	  is	  much	  more	  than	  just	  a	  voucher	  system	  
(Friedman	  1962,	  89;	  Friedman	  and	  Friedman	  1980,	  161;	  Friedman	  1955);	  it	  is	  a	  prescription	  to	  
Text	  Box	  1	  
Friedman-­‐Style	  School	  Choice	  Principles	  
1. Deregulation	  
2. Competition	  
3. Parental	  Demand	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deregulate	  and	  decentralize	  the	  education	  system,	  thereby	  enticing	  additional	  schools	  to	  enter	  
the	  market.	  	  
As	  more	  schools	  enter	  the	  market,	  competition	  increases	  resulting	  in	  more	  educational	  
options	  from	  which	  parents	  can	  choose.	  In	  an	  open	  market	  schools	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  consumer	  
preference,	  and	  so	  parental	  demand	  for	  education	  plays	  a	  large	  role	  in	  the	  market.	  Ultimately	  
Friedman	  theorized	  that	  by	  opening	  the	  market	  and	  allowing	  parents	  to	  choose,	  the	  overall	  
quality	  of	  educational	  entities	  would	  increase	  as	  parents	  selected	  schools	  that	  met	  their	  quality	  
preference	  (Friedman	  and	  Friedman	  1980,	  3;	  Butcher	  and	  Burke	  2013,	  3;	  Letelier	  1976;	  Burke	  
2012).	  	  
Deregulation:	  
School	  Choice	  is	  based	  on	  supply-­‐side	  economics.	  	  This	  economic	  perspective	  explains	  
that	  decreasing	  regulations	  on	  firms,	  or	  in	  this	  case	  schools,	  can	  stimulate	  growth	  resulting	  in	  
increased	  supply.	  According	  to	  Friedman,	  
deregulation	  needs	  to	  happen	  in	  two	  
ways.	  First,	  barriers	  to	  entry	  such	  as	  
zoning	  restrictions	  and	  legal	  paperwork	  
must	  be	  reduced	  so	  new	  schools	  are	  not	  
deterred	  from	  entering	  the	  market	  (Betts	  
2005,	  11-­‐12).	  Second,	  the	  central	  
government’s	  role	  in	  education	  needs	  to	  be	  reduced	  to	  setting	  minimum	  quality	  standards	  
(Friedman	  and	  Friedman	  and	  Friedman	  1980,	  169-­‐170).	  The	  goal	  of	  decreasing	  regulations	  in	  a	  
Text	  Box	  2	  
Deregulation:	  
• Reduce	  barriers	  to	  entry	  for	  schools	  
• Limit	  central	  government’s	  role	  to	  
setting	  minimum	  quality	  standards	  
Intended	  Result:	  More	  educational	  
entities	  are	  enticed	  into	  the	  market	  
allowing	  public	  and	  private	  schools	  to	  
openly	  compete	  
Arveseth	   	  Friedman’s	  School	  Choice	  Theory:	  	  The	  Chilean	  Education	  System	   10	  
school	  choice	  model	  is	  to	  entice	  more	  schools	  to	  enter	  the	  market	  creating	  increased	  
competition.	  	  
A	  reduction	  in	  regulations	  incentivizes	  new	  schools	  to	  enter	  the	  market	  because	  of	  the	  
flexibility	  and	  reduced	  oversight	  (The	  Laffer	  Center	  2011).	  Entrepreneurs	  are	  able	  to	  tailor	  their	  
schools	  according	  to	  the	  market	  to	  make	  a	  profit.	  Financial	  opportunity	  encourages	  more	  
schools	  to	  enter	  the	  education	  market.	  	  
Regarding	  the	  central	  government’s	  role,	  Friedman	  believed	  that	  it	  should	  be	  reduced	  to	  
setting	  minimum	  quality	  standards	  (Friedman	  1962,	  89;	  Friedman	  1955).	  In	  applying	  Friedman’s	  
theory,	  a	  government	  acts	  similarly	  to	  how	  it	  regulates	  restaurants.	  As	  it	  does	  when	  inspecting	  
food	  services	  to	  ensure	  minimum	  sanitary	  standards,	  a	  government	  would	  review	  educational	  
criteria	  to	  guarantee	  that	  minimum	  requirements	  are	  met	  (Friedman	  1962,	  89;	  Friedman	  1955).	  
Reducing	  the	  central	  government’s	  influence	  allows	  local	  administrators	  to	  have	  nearly	  
complete	  authority	  over	  public	  schools,	  and	  they	  are	  able	  to	  tailor	  their	  individual	  school’s	  
product	  offering	  in	  order	  to	  compete	  with	  other	  public	  and	  private	  schools	  for	  voucher	  funds.	  	  
Competition:	  
Under	  Friedman’s	  system	  both	  public	  and	  private	  schools	  compete	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  
market.	  Friedman	  stated	  that	  “we	  will	  only	  see	  improvements	  in	  education	  by	  privatizing	  a	  
major	  segment	  of	  the	  educational	  system—i.e.,	  by	  enabling	  a	  private,	  for-­‐profit	  industry	  to	  
develop	  that	  will	  provide	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  learning	  opportunities	  and	  offer	  effective	  
competition	  to	  public	  schools”	  (Burke	  2012).	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Competition	  is	  the	  crux	  to	  Friedman’s	  school	  choice.	  Without	  competition	  the	  benefits	  
of	  his	  model	  cannot	  be	  realized.	  As	  competition	  increases	  the	  education	  market	  moves	  toward	  
perfect	  competition,	  the	  situation	  in	  a	  
market	  when	  competition	  is	  at	  its	  greatest	  
possible	  level.	  Under	  perfect	  competition	  
the	  market	  price	  is	  at	  its	  lowest	  
sustainable	  level,	  and	  consumer	  surplus	  
or	  consumer	  satisfaction	  is	  at	  its	  highest,	  
an	  ideal	  scenario	  for	  the	  consumer	  
(Nicholson	  1992,	  427,	  464;	  Betts	  2005,	  3-­‐4).	  Although	  perfect	  competition	  is	  unattainable,	  as	  a	  
market	  moves	  toward	  perfect	  competition,	  society	  is	  able	  to	  enjoy	  some	  of	  its	  benefits.	  School	  
Choice	  Theory	  tries	  to	  harness	  the	  benefits	  of	  perfect	  competition	  by	  increasing	  competition	  
such	  that	  failing	  schools	  are	  forced	  out	  of	  the	  market	  (Friedman	  and	  Friedman	  1980,	  160-­‐163).	  	  
Although	  School	  Choice	  Theory	  can	  benefit	  from	  increased	  competition	  and	  consumer	  
choice,	  there	  are	  elements	  of	  perfect	  competition	  that	  are	  difficult	  to	  achieve	  in	  the	  market	  for	  
education,	  such	  as	  homogenous	  quality	  and	  perfect	  information.	  Friedman	  did	  not	  envision	  his	  
theory	  implemented	  in	  a	  perfectly	  competitive	  market.	  Instead,	  he	  built	  a	  model	  that	  could	  
access	  some	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  perfect	  competition	  in	  the	  existing	  education	  market.	  	  
Ultimately	  as	  School	  Choice	  Theory	  increases	  market	  competition	  the	  education	  market	  
profits	  from	  some	  elements	  that	  are	  also	  found	  in	  a	  market	  experiencing	  perfect	  competition.	  
The	  number	  of	  schools	  increases,	  meaning	  more	  choices	  for	  parents.	  The	  market	  price	  for	  
education	  decreases	  and	  education	  quality	  increases	  resulting	  in	  increased	  parental	  
Text	  Box	  3	  
Competition:	  
• Public	  and	  private	  schools	  encouraged	  
to	  openly	  compete	  for	  student	  
enrollment	  and	  associated	  funding	  
through	  voucher	  system	  
Intended	  Result:	  Failing	  schools	  do	  not	  
receive	  voucher	  payments	  and	  are	  forced	  
out	  of	  the	  market	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satisfaction.	  Although	  the	  quality	  of	  education	  under	  School	  Choice	  Theory	  is	  not	  consistent	  at	  
all	  levels,	  “the	  quality	  of	  all	  schooling	  would	  rise	  so	  much	  that	  even	  the	  worst,	  while	  it	  might	  be	  
relatively	  lower	  on	  the	  scale,	  would	  be	  better	  in	  absolute	  quality”	  (Friedman	  and	  Friedman	  
1980,	  170).	  
Parental	  Demand:	  
By	  deregulating	  the	  system	  and	  increasing	  competition,	  parental	  demand,	  rather	  than	  
centralized	  mandates,	  determines	  the	  supply	  of	  schools,	  students,	  and	  teachers	  in	  the	  open	  
education	  market	  (Friedman	  and	  
Friedman	  1980,	  169-­‐170).	  In	  order	  for	  a	  
school	  to	  be	  successful,	  it	  must	  cater	  to	  
society’s	  preferences	  and	  listen	  to	  
parental	  voice	  (Lopez	  et	  al.	  2012,	  49).	  	  
In	  a	  school	  choice	  model,	  schools	  
seek	  to	  maximize	  their	  profits	  by	  obtaining	  more	  vouchers.	  Simultaneously,	  parents	  shop	  for	  
the	  school	  that	  brings	  them	  the	  greatest	  satisfaction.	  Only	  those	  schools	  that	  meet	  parental	  and	  
student	  desires	  will	  remain	  in	  the	  market	  (Friedman	  and	  Friedman	  and	  Friedman	  1980,	  160-­‐
163).	  As	  the	  enrollment	  of	  a	  poor	  performing	  school	  drops,	  it	  is	  unable	  to	  maintain	  a	  profit	  and	  
is	  subsequently	  forced	  out	  of	  the	  market	  (Nicholson	  1992,	  443,	  464;	  Betts	  2005,	  4).	  
Furthermore,	  parental	  demands	  drive	  teachers’	  and	  administrators’	  incentives,	  which	  
results	  in	  an	  increase	  to	  school	  quality	  and	  equity	  (Burke	  2012;	  Joiko	  2013,	  1-­‐2;	  McEwan	  et	  al.	  
2008,5;	  Lopez	  2012,	  57).	  Montecinos	  et	  al.	  explain	  this	  concept	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  
From	  a	  demand	  perspective	  increased	  privatization	  purports	  to	  promote	  and	  affirm	  
parents’	  rights	  and	  individual	  responsibility	  in	  choosing	  a	  school.	  Theoretically,	  giving	  
Text	  Box	  4	  
Parental	  Demand:	  
• Education	  market	  reacts	  proportionally	  
to	  parental	  demand,	  eliminating	  
undesirable	  schools	  from	  market	  
• Increased	  parental	  voice	  in	  education	  
Intended	  Result:	  Societal	  satisfaction	  and	  
overall	  education	  quality	  increases	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the	  parents	  the	  right	  to	  choose	  will	  increase	  quality	  because	  they	  will	  choose	  a	  school	  
that	  shows	  good	  academic	  results	  and	  schools	  will	  make	  an	  effort	  to	  retain	  the	  fidelity	  
of	  the	  parents	  (2010,	  489).	  
	  
Under	  Friedman’s	  School	  Choice	  Theory,	  parents	  have	  the	  freedom	  to	  choose	  a	  school	  
based	  on	  quality	  and	  preferences	  (Lopez	  et	  al.	  2012,	  56;	  Friedman	  and	  Friedman	  1980,	  157).	  
Geographical	  boundaries	  do	  not	  restrict	  students,	  and	  parents	  can	  choose	  to	  educate	  their	  child	  
through	  public,	  private,	  charter,	  virtual	  or	  home	  school	  methods	  (Friedman	  1955).	  Parental	  
choice	  is	  considered	  “a	  rational	  choice	  driven	  by	  the	  market	  forces	  around	  education”	  (Joiko	  
2013,	  1).	  	  
	  
5. School	  Choice	  and	  Education	  Policy	  in	  Chile	  
In	  this	  section	  the	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  a	  Friedman-­‐style	  school	  choice	  system	  will	  
be	  compared	  to	  implementation	  of	  the	  
Chilean	  school	  system.	  	  The	  key	  indicators	  
for	  each	  principle,	  which	  are	  identified	  in	  
the	  previous	  section,	  will	  be	  used	  to	  assess	  
the	  level	  of	  Chile’s	  implementation	  of	  
Friedman’s	  school	  choice.	  The	  following	  
matrix	  previews	  the	  levels	  of	  
implementation	  that	  will	  be	  used	  for	  this	  
assessment	  (see	  Textbox	  5).	  	  
	  
	  
Text	  Box	  5	  
Levels	  of	  Implementation	  
Perfectly	  Implemented:	  follows	  Friedman’s	  
implementation	  and	  achieves	  expected	  
outcome	  
Adequately	  Implemented:	  does	  not	  align	  
perfectly	  with	  Friedman	  but	  achieves	  the	  
expected	  outcome	  
Inadequately	  Implemented:	  measures	  partially	  
implemented,	  results	  in	  dysfunction	  or	  failure	  to	  
achieve	  expected	  outcomes	  
Failed	  Implementation:	  measures	  not	  
successfully	  implemented	  and	  expected	  
outcome	  not	  achieved	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Deregulation:	  
As	  part	  of	  the	  1980s	  education	  reforms	  in	  Chile,	  the	  Chilean	  government	  reduced	  
barriers	  to	  entry	  in	  the	  education	  sector.	  Whereas	  Chile	  had	  previously	  limited	  education	  
options	  to	  public	  schools	  and	  a	  select	  number	  of	  private	  schools,	  these	  reforms	  allowed	  a	  
diverse	  group	  of	  additional	  private	  schools	  to	  enter	  the	  market.	  Chile	  experienced	  significant	  
growth	  in	  these	  private	  schools,	  and	  in	  six	  years	  the	  number	  of	  private	  schools	  increased	  from	  
1,700	  to	  2,700	  (Delannoy	  2000,	  11).	  This	  result	  aligns	  perfectly	  with	  Friedman’s	  prediction	  that	  
reduced	  barriers	  to	  entry	  will	  increase	  the	  number	  and	  diversity	  of	  schools	  in	  a	  marketplace.	  	  
Regarding	  jurisdiction,	  decentralization	  was	  only	  implemented	  at	  face	  value,	  and	  not	  in	  
adequate	  alignment	  with	  Friedman.	  Local	  governments	  received	  a	  degree	  of	  autonomy,	  but	  
always	  within	  the	  rules	  set	  by	  the	  central	  government	  (Serrano	  and	  Heidi	  2002,	  10).	  For	  
example	  municipal	  mayors	  were	  centrally	  appointed;	  therefore,	  the	  central	  government	  
continued	  to	  dictate	  decisions	  through	  the	  centrally	  appointed	  mayor	  rather	  than	  allowing	  
autonomy	  for	  local	  municipalities	  (Delannoy	  2000,	  10-­‐11).	  	  
Additionally,	  local	  governments	  remained	  weak	  relative	  to	  the	  central	  government.	  
Contrary	  to	  Friedman,	  municipal	  governments	  were	  given	  increased	  responsibility	  with	  little	  
capacity	  to	  exercise	  it	  due	  to	  their	  limited	  authority.	  For	  example	  many	  public	  school	  teachers	  
were	  offered	  tenure	  by	  the	  central	  government.	  This	  action	  created	  managerial	  obstacles	  for	  
the	  municipalities	  because	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  adjust	  the	  number	  of	  teachers	  according	  to	  
enrollment	  levels	  and	  salaries	  following	  market	  demand	  (Delannoy	  2000,	  16).	  	  As	  a	  result	  many	  
municipalities	  ran	  fiscal	  deficits,	  which	  were	  especially	  devastating	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  education	  in	  
poorer	  regions.	  These	  local	  governments	  were	  unable	  to	  adequately	  fund	  public	  schools,	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resulting	  in	  the	  failure	  of	  public	  schools	  to	  provide	  quality	  education.	  Consequently	  the	  overall	  
benefits	  of	  decentralization	  were	  limited	  (Delannoy	  2000,	  10-­‐11).	  	  
Friedman	  anticipated	  a	  period	  of	  adjustment	  as	  education	  is	  decentralized;	  however,	  
part	  of	  his	  anticipated	  adjustment	  would	  be	  the	  elimination	  of	  failing	  schools	  (Friedman	  1955).	  
In	  the	  Chilean	  case,	  the	  central	  government	  protected	  public	  schools	  from	  defaulting	  due	  to	  
competitive	  market	  forces.	  As	  explained	  in	  the	  following	  section,	  the	  central	  government	  
provided	  many	  failing	  public	  schools	  with	  additional	  financial	  support	  above	  that	  of	  the	  newly	  
introduced	  school	  voucher	  system	  (McEwan,	  2008,	  36).	  	  
Friedman-­‐Style	  School	  Choice	  Principle	   Chilean	  Level	  of	  Implementation	  
• Reduce	  barriers	  to	  entry	  for	  schools	  
• Limit	  central	  government’s	  role	  to	  setting	  
minimum	  quality	  standards	  
	  
Intended	  Result:	  More	  educational	  entities	  are	  
enticed	  into	  the	  market	  allowing	  public	  and	  private	  
schools	  to	  openly	  compete	  
Inadequately	  Implemented:	  barriers	  to	  entry	  were	  
reduced,	  but	  oversight	  of	  public	  schools	  was	  not	  
fully	  decentralized.	  
	  
Result:	  Number	  of	  educational	  entities	  increased	  
and	  private	  schools	  competed,	  but	  many	  public	  
schools	  were	  financially	  devastated	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  
of	  autonomy	  	  
	  
Competition:	  	  
Chile	  saw	  a	  significant	  shift	  from	  public	  to	  private	  schools	  in	  the	  1980s	  following	  the	  
education	  reforms.	  From	  1980	  to	  1985,	  private	  enrollment	  increased	  by	  93	  percent,	  and	  the	  
public	  school	  system	  lost	  some	  344,000	  students	  (Delannoy	  2000,	  11).	  As	  a	  result	  public	  schools	  
lost	  significant	  financial	  resources	  due	  to	  the	  decreased	  number	  of	  vouchers	  they	  received	  from	  
enrolled	  students	  (Hsieh	  and	  Urquiola	  2006,	  1481).	  According	  to	  Friedman	  these	  under-­‐
performing	  public	  schools	  should	  have	  been	  eliminated	  from	  the	  market;	  however,	  despite	  the	  
loss	  of	  traditional	  funding	  to	  public	  schools,	  the	  number	  of	  such	  institutions	  only	  decreased	  
slightly.	  The	  Chilean	  government	  transferred	  funds	  to	  failing	  public	  schools	  to	  subsidize	  local	  
public	  school	  deficits,	  thereby	  preventing	  the	  schools	  from	  closing	  (McEwan,	  2008,	  36).	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The	  main	  rational	  for	  saving	  public	  schools	  was	  the	  countrywide	  financial	  crisis	  of	  1982.	  
During	  this	  time	  the	  Chilean	  government	  occasionally	  froze	  voucher	  funds	  to	  schools	  to	  transfer	  
these	  funds	  to	  other	  portions	  of	  the	  economy	  (Serrano	  and	  Heidi,	  2002).	  The	  lack	  of	  voucher	  
funds	  had	  a	  devastating	  effect	  on	  public	  schools,	  because	  they	  were	  not	  permitted	  to	  charge	  
tuition	  above	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  voucher	  like	  private	  schools	  (Hsieh	  and	  Urquiola	  2006,	  1480).	  
Therefore	  public	  schools	  began	  to	  fail	  financially.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  Chilean	  government	  felt	  
compelled	  to	  save	  these	  public	  schools.	  This	  one	  time	  action	  is	  understandable,	  even	  under	  
Friedman’s	  theory.	  Public	  schools	  deserved	  the	  voucher	  funds	  they	  were	  previously	  unable	  to	  
access;	  however,	  the	  subsidizing	  of	  public	  schools	  continued	  beyond	  the	  initial	  repayment	  of	  
vouchers	  due.	  Consequently	  the	  incentive	  for	  public	  schools	  to	  compete	  was	  minimized	  
because	  subpar	  schools	  were	  bailed	  out	  by	  the	  central	  government;	  therefore,	  these	  schools	  
were	  not	  eliminated	  from	  the	  market	  (Hsieh	  and	  Urquiola	  2006,	  1482,	  1498).	  	  
Private	  schools,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  were	  able	  to	  charge	  tuition	  above	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  
voucher.	  Therefore	  they	  were	  not	  as	  drastically	  affected	  by	  the	  financial	  crisis	  as	  public	  schools.	  
Following	  this	  rough	  financial	  period,	  private	  schools	  were	  not	  continually	  bailed	  out	  by	  the	  
Chilean	  government	  like	  public	  schools,	  and	  consequently	  were	  required	  to	  compete	  for	  
funding	  through	  the	  school	  voucher	  system.	  The	  difference	  in	  the	  competitive	  natures	  of	  public	  
and	  private	  schools	  directly	  opposes	  the	  competitive	  foundation	  that	  Friedman	  had	  envisioned,	  
where	  public	  and	  private	  schools	  must	  equally	  compete	  through	  the	  voucher	  system.	  	  
The	  Chilean	  government	  introduced	  another	  avenue	  of	  competition,	  besides	  the	  
existing	  voucher	  system,	  into	  the	  market	  known	  as	  the	  System	  of	  Merit	  Awards	  to	  Schools	  
(SNED).	  The	  SNED	  was	  a	  test	  administered	  every	  year	  beginning	  in	  1996.	  SNED	  allowed	  schools	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to	  compete	  for	  additional	  government	  funding	  based	  on	  test	  scores	  (Delannoy	  2000,	  22-­‐23).	  
Smaller	  private	  schools	  tended	  to	  do	  better	  than	  larger	  public	  schools	  on	  the	  assessments	  
because,	  unlike	  public	  schools,	  they	  could	  reject	  students.	  As	  a	  result	  children	  were	  often	  
screened	  using	  tests	  and	  interviews	  before	  matriculating	  into	  a	  private	  school	  (Lopez	  2012,	  62;	  
Hsieh	  and	  Urquiola	  2006,	  1498;	  Bellei	  2004).	  	  
Through	  SNED	  the	  government	  disadvantaged	  lower	  performing	  students	  and	  
associated	  entities.	  The	  private	  school	  system	  in	  Chile	  became	  hyper-­‐focused	  on	  the	  test	  
performance	  of	  prospective	  students	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  funds	  available	  through	  the	  school	  
voucher	  system.	  These	  schools	  sought	  to	  attract	  students	  who	  would	  produce	  high-­‐test	  scores,	  
thereby	  resulting	  in	  increased	  government	  funding	  for	  the	  school	  through	  SNED.	  In	  contrast,	  
public	  schools	  were	  not	  allowed	  to	  reject	  poor-­‐performing	  students,	  so	  public	  schools	  became	  
further	  disincentivized	  to	  improve	  or	  compete	  through	  SNED	  (McEwan	  2008,	  30).	  	  
Friedman	  believed	  that	  through	  competition	  the	  quality	  of	  all	  schools	  in	  the	  market,	  
both	  public	  and	  private,	  would	  increase	  (Friedman	  and	  Friedman	  1980,	  170).	  Competitive	  
funding,	  like	  SNED,	  would	  be	  congruent	  with	  Friedman’s	  theory	  if	  all	  educational	  entities	  were	  
equal	  players.	  Unfortunately	  in	  the	  Chilean	  system	  the	  quality	  of	  public	  schools	  did	  not	  increase	  
with	  the	  quality	  of	  private	  schools	  because	  of	  their	  inability	  to	  attract	  high	  performing	  students.	  
Instead	  these	  schools	  remained	  complacent,	  relying	  upon	  government-­‐subsidized	  payments	  to	  
failing	  public	  schools	  rather	  than	  competing	  with	  private	  schools	  for	  increased	  student	  
enrollment	  including	  subsequent	  school	  voucher	  payments	  and	  additional	  SNED	  funding	  (Lopez	  
2012,	  62;	  Hsieh	  and	  Urquiola	  2006,	  1498;	  Bellei	  2004).	  The	  lack	  of	  congruent	  competition	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between	  all	  schools	  represents	  the	  largest	  divergence	  from	  Friedman’s	  theory	  in	  the	  Chilean	  
education	  system.	  
Friedman-­‐Style	  School	  Choice	  Principle	   Chilean	  Level	  of	  Implementation	  
Competition:	  
• Public	  and	  private	  schools	  encouraged	  to	  
openly	  compete	  for	  student	  enrollment	  
and	  associated	  funding	  through	  voucher	  
system	  
	  
Intended	  Result:	  Failing	  schools	  do	  not	  receive	  
voucher	  payments	  and	  are	  forced	  out	  of	  the	  
market	  increasing	  the	  overall	  quality	  of	  the	  school	  
system.	  
Inadequately	  Implemented:	  Private	  schools	  
competed	  amongst	  themselves,	  but	  public	  schools	  
did	  not.	  Government	  financial	  backing	  
disincentivized	  public	  schools	  to	  compete	  in	  the	  
market.	  
	  
Result:	  Failing	  public	  schools	  were	  not	  eliminated	  
from	  education	  market	  and	  remained	  a	  drag	  on	  
the	  quality	  of	  the	  educational	  system.	  	  
	  
Parental	  Demand:	  
The	  power	  of	  parental	  demand	  in	  the	  Chilean	  system	  was	  greatly	  diminished	  because	  
public	  schools	  did	  not	  respond	  to	  the	  education	  preferences	  of	  parents.	  In	  an	  ideal	  school	  
voucher	  system,	  funds	  would	  be	  directed	  toward	  the	  schools	  most	  preferred	  by	  parents,	  as	  was	  
the	  case	  with	  Chilean	  private	  schools.	  Unfortunately	  this	  was	  not	  the	  case	  with	  public	  schools,	  
because	  the	  education	  system	  in	  Chile	  was	  never	  truly	  decentralized.	  Public	  schools	  received	  
necessary	  funding	  regardless	  of	  vouchers.	  Consequently	  the	  marketplace	  did	  not	  adequately	  
react	  to	  parental	  demand	  regarding	  public	  schools,	  creating	  inefficiencies.	  Overall	  educational	  
quality	  suffered	  as	  a	  result.	  
Friedman	  did	  not	  theorize	  that	  educational	  quality	  would	  be	  equal.	  He	  recognized	  that	  
top	  and	  bottom	  schools	  would	  still	  exist,	  but	  he	  believed	  that	  the	  overall	  level	  of	  quality	  would	  
increase	  as	  parents	  selected	  schools	  that	  met	  their	  quality	  preferences.	  As	  the	  poorest	  
performing	  schools	  lose	  students	  and	  associated	  voucher	  payments,	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  
maintain	  a	  profit	  and	  are	  eliminated	  from	  the	  market.	  The	  Chilean	  system	  saw	  the	  top	  schools	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improve,	  as	  the	  lower	  schools	  remained	  stagnant.	  Because	  the	  central	  government	  provided	  
funding	  to	  the	  worst	  performing	  public	  schools,	  these	  schools	  were	  never	  eliminated	  like	  poor	  
performing	  private	  schools,	  nor	  were	  they	  incentivized	  to	  improve	  and	  capture	  voucher	  or	  
SNED	  funds.	  In	  comparison,	  top	  performing	  private	  schools	  excelled	  in	  the	  Chilean	  system	  
because	  they	  adjusted	  to	  parental	  demand	  in	  order	  to	  capture	  competitive	  funding.	  	  
Because	  the	  majority	  of	  bottom	  schools	  did	  not	  progress	  along	  with	  top	  schools,	  overall	  
educational	  quality	  did	  not	  improve	  as	  Friedman	  theorized.	  Hsieh	  and	  Urquiola,	  prominent	  
researchers	  of	  school	  choice,	  conducted	  a	  study	  that	  compared	  the	  test	  scores	  of	  Chilean	  
students	  to	  international	  students	  in	  science	  and	  mathematics.	  They	  compared	  the	  scores	  in	  
two	  years,	  1970	  and	  1999.	  These	  dates	  are	  significant	  because	  they	  represent	  student	  
performance	  both	  before	  and	  after	  the	  education	  reforms	  of	  the	  1980s.	  Hsieh	  and	  Urquiola	  
found	  that	  the	  median	  Chilean	  student	  did	  not	  improve	  relative	  to	  the	  median	  international	  
student	  over	  this	  same	  time	  interval	  (Hsieh	  and	  Urquiola	  2006,	  1478-­‐1479).	  	  
Parents	  were	  frustrated	  with	  the	  inability	  of	  Chile’s	  education	  system	  to	  provide	  
demanded	  quality.	  The	  voices	  of	  parents	  went	  unheard	  by	  public	  school	  administrators	  who	  did	  
not	  have	  to	  adjust	  the	  quality	  of	  education	  in	  their	  schools	  in	  order	  to	  succeed.	  Furthermore	  
school	  principals	  were	  often	  military	  personnel.	  The	  military	  is	  highly	  respected	  in	  Chile,	  and	  so	  
parents	  and	  teachers	  were	  unwilling	  to	  challenge	  military	  administrators’	  competence	  
(Delannoy	  2000,	  10-­‐11).	  Consequently,	  communication	  was	  not	  facilitated	  and	  parental	  
preferences	  went	  unheard	  within	  the	  public	  school	  system.	  
This	  disconnect	  between	  public	  administrators	  and	  parents	  existed	  despite	  the	  creation	  
of	  Parent	  Centers	  in	  the	  1980s	  education	  reforms.	  The	  chairmen	  of	  these	  centers	  were	  not	  
Arveseth	   	  Friedman’s	  School	  Choice	  Theory:	  	  The	  Chilean	  Education	  System	   20	  
freely	  elected	  but	  were	  instead	  appointed	  by	  a	  national	  coordinator	  (Lopez	  et	  al.	  2012,	  52).	  
Their	  position	  did	  not	  rely	  upon	  their	  ability	  to	  successfully	  implement	  the	  suggestions	  of	  local	  
parents.	  These	  centers	  were	  meant	  to	  create	  an	  avenue	  for	  parents	  to	  express	  their	  
preferences	  to	  school	  authorities;	  however,	  these	  Parent	  Centers	  did	  not	  allow	  parents	  a	  
greater	  voice	  in	  their	  child’s	  education.	  Instead	  they	  “accomplished	  merely	  [a]	  formal	  role,	  with	  
no	  influence	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  institutions”	  (	  De	  la	  Fuente	  and	  Raczynski	  2010,	  66).	  Again	  a	  lack	  
of	  decentralization	  hindered	  parental	  demand	  in	  the	  market.	  
Friedman’s	  model	  envisions	  a	  system	  that	  relies	  on	  parental	  demand	  to	  differentiate	  
between	  successful	  and	  unsuccessful	  schools;	  however,	  the	  financial	  safeguards	  built	  into	  the	  
Chilean	  system	  for	  failing	  public	  schools	  directly	  affected	  the	  education	  market’s	  ability	  to	  
efficiently	  operate.	  Consequently	  the	  lack	  of	  parental	  influence	  in	  the	  system	  has	  resulted	  in	  
frustration	  due	  to	  lower	  than	  expected	  quality	  in	  the	  education	  system.	  As	  a	  result	  Chilean	  
society	  has	  turned	  to	  other	  means,	  such	  as	  protesting,	  to	  voice	  preferences	  regarding	  
education.	  	  
Friedman-­‐Style	  School	  Choice	  Principle	   Chilean	  Level	  of	  Implementation	  
Parental	  Demand:	  
• Education	  market	  reacts	  proportionally	  to	  
parental	  demand,	  eliminating	  undesirable	  
schools	  from	  market	  
• Increased	  parental	  voice	  in	  education	  
	  
Intended	  Result:	  Societal	  satisfaction	  and	  
overall	  education	  quality	  increases	  
Inadequate	  Implemented:	  Subpar	  private	  schools	  
were	  eliminated	  from	  the	  market,	  but	  poor-­‐
performing	  public	  schools	  were	  not.	  Public	  schools	  
were	  not	  swayed	  by	  parental	  preferences	  due	  to	  
government	  funding	  besides	  vouchers	  
	  
Result:	  Widespread	  dissatisfaction	  with	  education	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6.	  Conclusion:	  
The	  Chilean	  education	  system	  should	  not	  be	  categorized	  as	  Friedman’s	  School	  Choice	  
Theory	  because	  it	  does	  not	  represent	  an	  adequate	  application	  of	  Friedman’s	  theory.	  Most	  
notably,	  deregulation	  of	  the	  education	  
market	  was	  incomplete,	  and	  public	  schools	  
have	  not	  competed	  because	  they	  received	  
funding	  regardless	  of	  performance.	  
Furthermore,	  parental	  demand	  has	  had	  little	  impact	  on	  the	  overall	  quality	  of	  education,	  as	  poor	  
performing	  public	  schools	  have	  failed	  to	  improve	  with	  competitive	  private	  schools.	  	  
Partial	  and	  uneven	  implementation	  of	  school	  choice	  principles	  in	  Chile’s	  educational	  
system	  has	  resulted	  in	  an	  educational	  class	  system,	  one	  vehemently	  rejected	  by	  the	  populace.	  	  
Student	  leader,	  Camila	  Vallejo	  stated,	  “We	  don't	  want	  to	  improve	  the	  system,	  it	  has	  to	  be	  
changed”	  (Al	  Jazeera	  2011).	  	  The	  Chilean	  education	  system	  has	  essentially	  remained	  the	  same	  
since	  the	  reforms	  of	  the	  1980s	  (Hsieh	  and	  Urquiola	  2006,	  1480).	  The	  initial	  voucher	  system	  
implemented	  in	  the	  early	  1980s	  remains	  in	  force	  (McEwan	  et	  al.	  2008,	  3),	  and	  approximately	  92	  
percent	  of	  primary	  and	  secondary	  students	  attend	  either	  a	  public	  or	  private	  school	  that	  
receives	  some	  form	  of	  government	  assistance	  (Embassy	  of	  Chile,	  2005).	  	  
As	  indicated	  by	  the	  graph,	  approximately	  72	  percent	  of	  children	  from	  families	  in	  the	  
lowest	  40	  percent	  of	  the	  income	  distribution	  were	  attending	  public	  schools	  in	  1990.	  For	  the	  
next	  highest	  40	  percent,	  51	  percent	  of	  children	  attended	  public	  schools	  compared	  to	  43	  percent	  
in	  subsidized	  public	  schools.	  Only	  25	  percent	  of	  children	  in	  the	  top	  20	  percent	  of	  income	  
Textbox	  6	  
Chilean	  Implementation	  
Deregulation	  =	  Inadequately	  Implemented	  
Competition	  =	  Inadequately	  Implemented	  
Parental	  Demand	  =	  Inadequately	  Implemented	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Source:	  (Fábrega	  2009)	  
attended	  public	  schools	  compared	  to	  32	  percent	  in	  subsidized	  public	  schools	  and	  43	  percent	  in	  
private	  tuition	  schools	  (Carnoy	  1998,	  317-­‐318).	  	  
Today,	  the	  school	  distribution	  is	  
essentially	  the	  same.	  Rich	  families	  send	  their	  
children	  to	  high-­‐quality	  private	  schools	  while	  
children	  from	  poorer	  families	  attend	  badly	  
managed	  public	  schools.	  The	  Organisation	  for	  
Economic	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development	  
(OECD)	  has	  described	  the	  education	  in	  Chile	  
as	  a	  “system	  of	  class	  segregation”	  (Guzman-­‐Concha	  2012,	  412).	  	  
The	  Chilean	  Education	  Ministry	  categorizes	  schools	  into	  five	  groups	  based	  upon	  the	  
demographics	  of	  the	  students	  attending.	  As	  a	  basis	  for	  analysis,	  the	  following	  criteria	  are	  
considered:	  	  parents’	  education,	  household	  
income,	  and	  school	  characteristics.	  In	  2009	  
gaps	  in	  the	  educational	  output	  for	  the	  top	  and	  
bottom	  schools	  based	  on	  these	  factors	  were	  
very	  pronounced.	  In	  reading	  the	  gap	  was	  26	  
percent	  in	  the	  fourth	  grade	  and	  later	  grew	  to	  
36	  percent	  by	  the	  tenth	  grade.	  The	  math	  score	  
gap	  in	  the	  fourth	  grade	  was	  36	  percent	  and	  increased	  to	  55	  percent	  in	  the	  tenth	  grade	  (Fábrega	  
2009).	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Commenting	  on	  the	  education	  gap,	  Vallejo	  stated	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  Al	  Jazeera,	  
“When	  you	  see	  education	  reinforcing	  inequality,	  you	  think,	  no,	  we	  have	  to	  fight	  this”	  (McIntyre	  
2010,	  26-­‐27).	  Commenting	  further	  she	  said,	  “[This	  inequality]	  is	  lived	  daily	  and…is	  the	  result	  of	  
this	  [economic]	  model	  and,	  more	  specifically,	  of	  those	  who	  maintain	  it;	  a	  small	  class	  of	  people	  
that	  handle	  not	  only	  the	  economic	  power,	  but	  also	  political	  power	  and	  control	  of	  the	  media”	  
(McIntyre	  2010,	  26-­‐27).	  	  
What	  began	  as	  a	  cry	  for	  educational	  reform	  in	  Chile	  has	  become	  a	  battle	  against	  
neoliberalist	  ideals.	  Chile	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  forerunner	  in	  Latin	  America	  for	  its	  free-­‐market	  system	  
instituted	  by	  Pinochet	  and	  his	  advisors,	  but	  Chile’s	  impressive	  economic	  growth	  has	  not	  been	  
distributed	  evenly.	  Chile	  has	  the	  highest	  per	  capita	  income	  of	  any	  country	  in	  South	  America,	  but	  
it	  also	  regales	  the	  continent's	  greatest	  income	  gap	  between	  the	  rich	  and	  the	  poor.	  To	  Chileans,	  
the	  education	  system	  has	  come	  to	  symbolize	  this	  economic	  injustice,	  and	  societal	  rejection	  is	  
evident	  through	  the	  frequency	  of	  protests	  (Al	  Jazeera	  2011;	  McIntyre	  2010,	  26-­‐27;	  Aman	  1991,	  
7).	  
Chileans	  are	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  large	  gap	  in	  educational	  quality	  between	  private	  and	  
public	  schools	  (Al	  Jazeera	  2011).	  They	  seek	  a	  more	  equitable	  system	  that	  holds	  public	  schools	  
accountable	  for	  deficiencies	  in	  curricula.	  Furthermore,	  protesters	  have	  been	  so	  disenfranchised	  
with	  their	  school	  choice	  experience	  that	  they	  desire	  an	  entirely	  new	  education	  system,	  favoring	  
increased	  government	  regulation	  in	  all	  aspects	  of	  education	  (Fábrega	  2009;	  Guzman-­‐Concha	  
2012,	  412-­‐413;	  McEwan	  2008,	  25).	  	  
Aside	  from	  decoupling	  the	  Chilean	  education	  system	  from	  Milton	  Friedman’s	  School	  
Choice	  Theory,	  the	  most	  important	  point	  this	  thesis	  illustrates	  is	  that	  school	  choice	  must	  be	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assessed	  as	  a	  system.	  Individual	  principles	  cannot	  be	  regarded	  as	  useful	  or	  helpful	  on	  their	  own	  
without	  the	  supporting,	  interrelated	  structure	  supplied	  by	  the	  other	  principles.	  The	  
deregulation	  of	  the	  education	  system	  facilitates	  increased	  competition	  as	  additional	  schools	  
enter	  the	  market.	  Through	  the	  voucher	  system,	  parental	  demand	  affects	  the	  distribution	  of	  
students	  in	  the	  competitive	  marketplace.	  As	  parents	  choose	  quality	  schools	  through	  vouchers,	  
low-­‐performing	  schools	  cannot	  maintain	  a	  profit	  and	  are	  naturally	  eliminated	  from	  the	  market.	  
As	  these	  schools	  exit	  the	  market,	  the	  overall	  educational	  quality	  increases	  and	  societal	  
satisfaction	  is	  present.	  Without	  adequate	  implementation	  of	  each	  principle,	  the	  system	  as	  a	  
whole	  is	  unable	  to	  succeed.	  
Unfortunately	  the	  impact	  of	  government	  interference	  in	  the	  education	  market	  has	  led	  
to	  market	  inefficiencies.	  By	  saving	  failing	  public	  schools,	  the	  Chilean	  government	  aided	  public	  
schools	  in	  their	  march	  to	  complacency.	  Public	  schools	  did	  not	  feel	  compelled	  to	  contend	  against	  
private	  schools	  for	  vouchers	  or	  additional	  government	  funding	  because	  public	  schools	  received	  
monetary	  support	  regardless	  of	  their	  performance.	  Consequently	  the	  quality	  of	  public	  schools	  
did	  not	  improve	  at	  or	  near	  the	  rate	  that	  private	  schools	  improved.	  	  
The	  lack	  of	  competition	  in	  the	  market	  led	  to	  stratification	  and	  the	  stagnation	  of	  overall	  
educational	  quality	  (Fábrega	  2009).	  Public	  schools	  were	  not	  enticed	  to	  compete	  in	  the	  
marketplace	  for	  voucher	  payments	  because	  the	  central	  government	  was	  providing	  funding	  to	  
these	  schools	  regardless	  of	  performance.	  In	  contrast	  private	  schools	  did	  not	  receive	  
government	  funding	  beyond	  initial	  voucher	  payments;	  therefore,	  they	  competed	  for	  student	  
enrollment	  (and	  subsequent	  voucher	  payments)	  and	  test-­‐based	  funding,	  known	  as	  SNED.	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Private	  schools	  were	  profit-­‐driven,	  and,	  in	  order	  to	  capture	  SNED	  funding,	  they	  sought	  to	  entice	  
high	  performing	  students	  to	  enroll.	  	  
Parents	  became	  dissatisfied	  by	  the	  education	  options	  available	  for	  their	  children	  as	  
public	  schools	  ignored	  parental	  demands	  for	  higher	  quality	  schools	  that	  addressed	  the	  needs	  of	  
individual	  students.	  Exogenous	  incentives,	  such	  as	  SNED,	  control	  the	  market	  rather	  than	  
parental	  demand	  (Delannoy	  2000,	  22-­‐23).	  Additionally	  the	  creation	  of	  Parent	  Centers	  failed	  to	  
provide	  the	  Chilean	  education	  system	  with	  an	  adequate	  avenue	  by	  which	  parents	  could	  express	  
preferences.	  
Ultimately	  the	  lack	  of	  competition	  and	  the	  subsequent	  lack	  of	  benefits	  resulting	  from	  a	  
competitive	  market	  is	  Chile’s	  main	  divergence	  from	  Friedman.	  Consequently	  the	  intended	  
results	  are	  not	  equivalent	  to	  those	  outlined	  by	  Friedman;	  rather,	  they	  are	  unique	  to	  the	  Chilean	  
education	  system.	  Additionally	  a	  school	  choice	  system’s	  merit	  is	  holistic	  in	  nature,	  and	  
successful	  overall	  implementation	  requires	  the	  adequate	  inclusion	  of	  all	  interrelated	  principles.	  
Fidelity	  to	  these	  principles	  is	  essential	  in	  order	  to	  critically	  analyze	  the	  outcomes	  of	  Friedman’s	  
School	  Choice	  Theory.	  Therefore,	  the	  Chilean	  education	  system	  should	  not	  be	  categorized	  or	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